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Healthcare relies on a variety of regulatory activities to manage
risks to the public and to drive improvement. But the regulation
of patient safety in healthcare, and in the NHS in particular, is
“bewildering in its complexity and prone to both overlaps of
remit and gaps between different agencies.”1 Regulatory
activities touch every single aspect of care delivery and place
considerable demands on professionals and organisations alike,
in the form of inspections, certification, accreditation,
revalidation, and compliance reporting.
We argue that the safety regulatory system, as seen from the
perspective of provider organisations, is much larger and more
complex than usually supposed. Individual regulators might
achieve valuable impact, but the system as a whole is
unnecessarily burdensome, produces multiple unintended
consequences, and, most importantly, fragments and dilutes
regulatory impact. We discuss the nature of these problems and
set out a series of practical proposals for tackling these critical
challenges.
What is regulation?
Regulation can be defined as the “processes that aim to shape,
motivate, monitor, and modify the practices and technologies
within organisations so as to achieve some desired state of
affairs.”2 Regulatory activities take many forms, not all of them
formal or backed by coercive or legal force.3 The work of
regulating patient safety reaches from the “ivory towers” of
policy making and standard setting to the “adobe huts” of local
participation and frontline decision making.4
Regulation is achieved in multiple ways and by many different
organisations. Statutory regulators, such as the Care Quality
Commission and the General Medical Council, conduct
inspections, monitor standards, and carry out a range of other
activities. Many other organisations exert a regulatory effect on
NHS organisations in the sense of inspecting, monitoring,
influencing performance, and other activities (box 1, box 2).
Royal colleges, for example, set standards, review training, and
influence organisations and individuals through the
encouragement and enforcement of professional norms. They
also set standards and have the power to impose sanctions, such
as withdrawal of approval of training.
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Box 1: Regulatory activities and definitions5
Registration
Registration of healthcare professionals to ensure compliance with legal
requirements
Accreditation
Accreditation, licensing, or revalidation to maintain and assure professional
skills
Policy provider
Setting of formal rules and guidelines
Monitoring of services and professionals
Systematic collection of information to assess and maintain standards of care
Investigation
Formal examination of an incident
Inspection
Formal examination or visit to assess standards of care
Imposition of sanctions
Penalties or fines for disobeying a law or rule
Quality improvement
Performance analysis and systematic attempt to improve it
Analysis and sharing of data
Collection of data, analysis, and potentially sharing with other regulatory
organisations
Advice and support for the public
Publishing performance evaluations or other information on standards
Advice and support for healthcare providers or other regulators
Providing professional or legal advice to professionals and organisations
Representation
Representing professionals in the maintenance of standards
Professional development
Programmes of education and training to equip professionals with knowledge,
skills, and competences
Research
Systematic investigation of events and information relevant to maintaining
standards
Box 2: Organisations with regulatory impact
Defined as those who do all of the following5:
• Consider the improvement of patient safety a part of their organisational
responsibilities
• Undertake some form or monitoring of safety related standards or
performance
• Attempt to influence the safety performance of NHS provider
organisations
• Derive some form of legitimacy or external authority for their work on
safety
Regulation of patient safety in the NHS
In 2002, in a paper discussing the rise of regulation in the NHS,
Kieran Walshe argued that “current regulators vary widely in
their statutory authority, powers, scope of action, and approach.
The resulting mosaic of regulatory arrangements is highly
fragmented, and some roles are duplicated.”6 Since then, the
complexity of the system has increased considerably, and several
reports have argued for a less complex, more patient centred
approach.7-9 None of these reports, however, have described the
totality of the regulatory system, making it difficult to make
concrete plans for reform. We recently identified 126
organisations with regulatory influence that might interact with
each English NHS trust (see supplementary figure).5
Arrangements differ for Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland,
but these systems face some similar problems.
In brief, NHS trusts are firstly responsible to the three national
bodies that oversee the system and fund, lead, and support
healthcare in England: the Department of Health and Social
Care, NHS England, and Public Health England. In addition,
they work directly with several clinical commissioning groups
that carry out regulatory functions, such as requiring and
monitoring reports on serious incidents.
In total, 17 statutory regulators with a specific remit for patient
safety oversee healthcare institutions, professionals, and clinical
procedures. There are also two agencies overseeing the
management of medical products and a host of other regulators
that operate across all industries to manage hazardous substances
and practices such as radiotherapy.
We identified over 100 other organisations that might exert a
regulatory influence on the NHS through their actions and
activities.5 This group includes national agencies (such as the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence and the
Healthcare Safety Investigation Branch), professional bodies
(such as the Royal College of Physicians), and organisations
that seek patient views, which are used to improve services
(such as Healthwatch England). These organisations might not
see themselves as regulators, but nonetheless they carry out
some regulatory activities: many of them set standards, ask for
data, and carry out inspections, and some are able to impose
sanctions. They, therefore, have a major regulatory impact on
provider organisations.
Unintended consequences of the current
system
Individual regulatory organisations can undoubtedly have
positive effects, but the system has many unintended
consequences for both providers and regulatory organisations.
Duplication of effort
Despite efforts to improve information sharing, different bodies
continue to request the same safety information in different
formats.10 Several different bodies collect information on
safeguarding, consent, infection control, staff training, and
medicines management, for example, albeit for slightly different
purposes. The net effect is that trusts have to repackage
information collated for one regulator to meet the specific
requirements of another.8 The Care Quality Commission is
developing a more streamlined information system for sourcing
data,11 but there is a limit to what it can achieve alone in such
a complex landscape.
Variability in approach
The Professional Standards Authority has pointed out that all
nine of the professional regulatory bodies it oversees have a
common set of functions, yet they have pronounced differences
in legislation, standards, and approach.12 So different NHS
professionals are regulated differently, with almost no
integration between the regulation of individuals and the
organisations they work in.
Fragmented approach
Regulatory organisations manage numerous jurisdictional
boundaries between each other. The Francis Inquiry found that
the responsibilities and accountabilities of external agencies
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were not well defined, often resulting in “regulatory gaps” or
failure to follow up warning signs.13 Criticism might be made
of specific organisations, but the more fundamental problem is
the plethora of agencies and the lack of clarity about who is
responsible for oversight of which services. By contrast, aviation
and other safety critical industries have a clearly defined
regulatory structure, usually with a single dominant central
regulator (such as the Civil Aviation Authority), so the lines of
responsibility and accountability are much clearer.
Culture of compliance rather than safety
improvement
Leadership attention is a scarce resource. If executives and
clinical leaders are too busy meeting multiple (sometimes
conflicting) regulatory standards, they have less chance of
anticipating and resolving emerging patient safety risks in their
organisations.14 NHS boards can become so focused on meeting
external standards that a culture of compliance predominates,
and “regulatory myopia” sets in. In these circumstances, safety
and quality improvement is marginalised in favour of a display
of compliance, which might degenerate into a denial of risks
and safety challenges.
Dilution of impact
The impact of any intervention by one regulator, however
important, is diluted because NHS trusts are also attempting to
respond to many other agencies that are making similar but not
identical requests. Almost inevitably, trusts will fall back on
demonstrations of compliance rather than the more substantial
long term improvements that both regulators and trusts would
prefer.
What practical steps can be taken?
Regulating the safety of healthcare is complex, but the current
regulatory system is unnecessarily so and needs urgent reform.
This might seem to require yet another high level reorganisation
with all the accompanying disruption. But we think that much
could be achieved with a collaborative programme to
systematically rethink, harmonise, and integrate the activities
of the multiple bodies with regulatory influence. If reform or
statutory changes are needed, they should follow, not precede,
the work of synthesis and integration.
No single healthcare regulator can tackle these systemic
problems alone, but trying to coordinate 126 organisations in a
reform programme would lead to frustration and stasis. A small
group of major regulatory organisations, however, could begin
the process, model an approach, and seek some early gains (box
3). We suggest that the Care Quality Commission should take
the lead in forming a small group of regulatory organisations
that would each commit a small resource (one or two members
of staff each initially) to begin the process of simplifying and
harmonising the system.
Box 3: 10 practical approaches to improve regulatory efficiency
and effectiveness
Develop a common language, a set of objectives, and an understanding
of regulation across regulatory organisations
Harmonise the format and timing of data collection from trusts across
regulatory organisations
Harmonise standards across regulators to abolish conflict and reduce
replication
Identify and reduce duplication of regulatory activity in which multiple
regulators oversee the same clinical processes
Zero tolerance of “regulatory repackaging requests,” in which healthcare
providers are asked to repackage the same information multiple times in
different formats
Map the complete regulatory demands on each trust and assess the
overall benefit, risks, and financial and opportunity costs
Collate evidence on the extent to which resources allocated to patient
safety improvement work by trusts is diverted by regulatory inspections
and demands
Compare the proportions of trust staff engaged in meeting regulatory
demands with those of staff whose principal role is safety and quality
improvement
Inspect, support, and encourage improvement activity rather than only
monitoring compliance
Simplify the regulatory structure for patient safety ensuring there is a
single agency identified as the lead regulator for health and social care.
Integrate and harmonise regulatory structures
and activities
In the short term, small steps could be taken with fairly
straightforward, time limited projects such as harmonising the
format and timing of data collection, mapping duplication of
effort between participating organisations, identifying
non-productive regulatory activity, and identifying areas in
which one regulator could draw on the findings of another
without re-inspecting the same organisation. Even cursory
inquiries to trusts show multiple examples of duplication of
effort that could be resolved relatively easily with considerable
savings in time and resources.
Develop a shared framework of regulatory
objectives, models, and language
A common language and set of shared ideas and agreed
objectives is essential when attempting to coordinate any sort
of regulatory activity—and this has been achieved over time in
many other industries.15 Health regulators have been urged to
develop a shared “theory of regulation” that encompasses a
common purpose, common objectives, and a shared
understanding of the association between regulation and
improvement.12
In practice, this would include the development of objectives,
terminology, and practices as well as a shared understanding of
how regulation best achieves its intended effects. The broad
range of risks that healthcare regulation is seeking to
manage—from misdiagnosis to inappropriate care and emotional
harm—should be clearly articulated. The core group could lead
initial work then seek wider consultation and engagement, which
would allow further harmonisation across the system.
Evaluate the activities, costs, and benefits of
regulation across the entire system
The regulatory system has changed over time, with a gradual
accretion of new functions, bodies, and requirements. A
systematic and detailed mapping of the activities, impact, and
cost of regulatory activities is required. This should include a
full recording and costing of all the time spent by trusts
responding to regulatory requests of all kinds from all relevant
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organisations. This is ambitious and complex but essential if
improvements are to be well targeted and sustained.
Long term coordination and integration
Healthcare is complex and probably cannot be overseen by a
single regulator. In the longer term, however, it should be
possible to greatly reduce the number of organisations and
identify a single body to coordinate and integrate the overall
regulatory system. Such a body, which could be a coalition of
several of the major regulators, would seek to integrate
regulatory activity along the entire patient journey, considering
care within organisations, across patient transitions, and in
community settings.
Conclusions
Sensible and proportionate regulation should be an essential
foundation of safe, high quality patient care but is not remotely
achievable in the present system. The regulatory system of the
NHS is not fully understood even by professional regulators
and government; it is almost impossible for the general public
to navigate or even understand it.
Complex systems need to be carefully designed to ensure that
they serve their intended functions. A broad, participative, and
practical programme of system analysis and design is needed,
encompassing everything from the overarching principles to
the practicalities of data collection, communication, and
influence. This is a necessary foundation for the longer term
objective of a more responsive, improvement focused
relationship between regulators and providers of services.
This is ambitious but entirely feasible. Much can be achieved
with no major reorganisation or statutory reform. The benefits
of reforming NHS regulation are considerable for regulators,
providers, and, most importantly, patients and families, who
will be much better protected in a simpler, sharper regulatory
system.
Key messages
• The current regulatory system of the NHS is burdensome for both
providers and regulators, has multiple unintended consequences, and
fragments and dilutes regulatory impact
• The system needs to be redesigned to be efficient and adaptable for
both the regulators and the organisations they oversee
• The Care Quality Commission should coordinate a small group of major
regulatory organisations to reform the system
• Primary initial tasks are to achieve a common understanding of
objectives and methods and to harmonise and integrate data collection
and other regulatory activities
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